

**BY ORDER OF THE COMMANDER
AIR MOBILITY COMMAND**

AIR MOBILITY COMMAND PAMPHLET 10-703

18 DECEMBER 2002



Operations

AMC MILITARY DECEPTION AWARENESS

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<http://www.e-publishing.af.mil>

OPR: HQ AMC/DOKI (Mr. Lou Lombardi)
Supersedes AMCPAM 10-703,
28 December 1999

Certified by: HQ AMC/DOK (Lt Col Szpila)
Pages: 17
Distribution: F

This pamphlet is an introduction to military deception (MD) and supports AFD 10-7, *Command and Control Warfare*, and AFI 10-704, *Military Deception*, by providing guidance for planning, coordinating, and executing military deception. This pamphlet is applicable to all AMC wings. It does not apply to Air National Guard and United States Air Force Reserve units.

SUMMARY OF REVISIONS

This document is substantially revised and must be completely reviewed.

This publication has been completely revised. To standardize terminology at all levels, the program name at the wing level changes from Tactical Deception to Military Deception. Additional significant changes include: an increased focus on commander support, chapter reorganization, updates to phone numbers, and numerous significant administrative changes.

Chapter 1

INTRODUCTION

"All warfare is based on deception." Sun Tzu (4th Century B.C.)

1.1. Scope. This pamphlet provides concepts, methods, and helpful hints for establishing and conducting a wing MD program. The end result, development and implementation of MD operations, requires commitment, creativity, and skill development. Training and practice lead to experience, confidence, and proficiency.

1.2. Definition and Objective. MD is an activity designed to mislead enemy commanders, inducing the enemy to react in a manner favorable to friendly interests. This is done by manipulating, distorting, or falsifying information provided to enemy operational commanders, causing them to misallocate their combat, combat support, and intelligence resources. MD misleads enemy commanders, which increases the chances of success for friendly operations.

1.2.1. To develop an effective MD plan we must first answer the following questions:

1.2.1.1. What is the critical secret that you are trying to protect?

1.2.1.2. How interested is the enemy in our activities?

1.2.1.3. Who is the target decision-maker?

1.2.1.4. Are we capable of obtaining feedback to see how well our deception worked?

1.2.1.5. Is the mission dependent on deception? (Mission success should **never** depend on the deception plan.)

1.2.2. MD is an attitude and a mindset. It is a critical war skill that must be practiced now, not when we are exchanging fire. It must be second nature to all who plan and participate in operations. It extends beyond the operator and requires the commitment and involvement of all supporting functions as well as wing and subordinate unit commanders. The potential benefit that deception can create is significant.

1.2.3. MD operations will only be planned and executed by trained Military Deception Officers (MDO), Military Deception Noncommissioned Officers (MDNCO), and those individuals specifically identified by the MDO. The term MDO is used throughout this document but can be applied to MDNCOs as well.

1.3. Awareness Training. Everyone should be aware that deception is a legal form of warfare. The Hague Convention of 1907 recognized deception as a permissible war strategy and tactic. Therefore, operations planners must include MDOs in their conflict preparation activities.

1.3.1. It is the responsibility of the MDO to educate the wing and unit staff regarding the deception program capabilities. The MD Advocacy brief was designed for this purpose and is available on CD through formal training.

1.3.2. It is the responsibility of the wing commander to insure full support of this program by subordinate unit commanders.

NOTE: For any questions concerning this pamphlet, the AMC MD program in general, or to recommend changes, contact HQ AMC/DOKI, DSN 779-4569, or extensions 4570 or 4572.

Chapter 2

HISTORY

"All warfare is based on deception. Hence, when able to attack we must seem unable; when using our forces, we must seem inactive; when we are near, we must make the enemy believe that we are far away; when far away, we must make him believe that we are near. Hold out baits to entice the enemy. Feign disorder, and crush him." Sun Tzu (4th Century B.C.)

2.1. General. Various methods of deception have been invaluable to military commanders in determining the outcome of conflicts throughout the spectrum of warfare. History is replete with examples of the successful use of deception operations, from World War II to Korea, from Vietnam to the Persian Gulf War, and throughout the Balkan conflicts of the 1990s.

2.2. Surprise. Surprise is an essential element in successful operations. MD enhances surprise by causing confusion, uncertainty, and misallocation of adversarial resources. History provides many examples of how deception has enhanced surprise and resulted in operational success. Dr. Barton Whaley, a noted researcher from the Fletcher School of Law, conducted an extensive study of deception and surprise in warfare. He analyzed casualty ratios from some 168 battles between 1914 and 1968 and concluded that deception was significant in enabling surprise and, hence, success. (NOTE: Specific details on his findings are outlined in the Military Deception Course Study Guide) The bottom line: Deception greatly enhances chances for mission success and survivability.

Chapter 3

MILITARY DECEPTION AND THE AMC MISSION

3.1. General. AMC forces are a critical element in any future hostility. We must therefore plan and apply MD throughout the spectrum of AMC operations and develop a mindset where MD is second nature to all airlift and tanker operations.

3.1.1. MD, like other instruments of military power, is designed to support military commanders in achieving their battlefield and mission objectives. MD is a deliberate action taken to complement air power employment principles and applies throughout the spectrum of operations. Because of AMC's worldwide operations and DoD interface, we can and do play a vital role in the development and coordination of MD activities and initiatives.

3.1.2. In a combat environment, MD must be a fundamental consideration in the development and implementation of strategies and tactics. It can cause our adversaries confusion, which will result in misallocation of their resources, enhancing our chance for success.

3.1.3. MD is applicable across the entire spectrum of AMC operations. The worldwide scope of AMC missions and the complex support relationships with other commands and services provide numerous opportunities for application of MD. AMC activities can provide unique operational signatures and indicators that are exploitable by adversaries. MDOs can use these signatures to manipulate, distort, desensitize, and otherwise confuse adversarial perceptions and collection efforts.

3.1.4. MD in combat acts as a force multiplier. By using MD techniques commanders can manipulate opposing commanders' perceptions of AMC forces, intentions, and capabilities. MD planners can build on adversary confusion and uncertainty and cause them to make decisions favorable to friendly intentions. It is important that commanders and those involved with operational planning, support activities, and mission execution understand MD. They must be educated as to what deception can do to support AMC's operations, and conceptualize and implement MD actions and activities against specific targets as scenarios demand. Commanders should prepare to execute deception by integrating MD goals into local exercises and training scenarios.

3.2. Uses of Military Deception.

3.2.1. AMC forces, with HQ AMC approval and coordination, should use MD against an opponent when supporting combat operations. AMC assets are vulnerable to most counter-air weapons and are often tasked to fly in medium and high threat environments. Even in a low threat environment, man-portable surface-to-air missiles, light anti-aircraft artillery, heavy machine guns, and automatic small arms create concern for aircraft survivability. Deception planners must apply MD concepts to protect AMC resources in any threat environment.

3.2.2. Commanders and MDOs must use appropriate exercises to develop and strengthen wartime MD planning abilities. It is strongly recommended that the MDO act as a member of the wing exercise working group. This will enable proper MD exercise planning in conjunction with other wing exercises. MD cannot be effectively planned after the fact; planning must run concurrent to be effective.

3.3. Application. MD is designed to support a specific mission objective. Operations containing more than one objective would require more than one MD objective. To ensure MD will support the desired

mission and not confuse or conflict with other friendly operations, proposed MD operations must be authorized by HQ AMC/DOKI unless under the Operational Control (OPCON) of another HQ. In such instances, authorization is vested in the appropriate approval authority (the air component or joint task force commander). AMC forces may be involved in MD in order to:

- 3.3.1. Achieve surprise.
- 3.3.2. Divert enemy attention and forces.
- 3.3.3. Induce withdrawal of enemy forces.
- 3.3.4. Mislead enemy intelligence.
- 3.3.5. Confuse the target as to friendly intentions.
- 3.3.6. Conceal force employment and deployment or employment and deployment activities.

3.4. Commander's Responsibility. Wing commanders are responsible for identifying appropriate resources (manpower, funds, equipment, etc.), establishing MD awareness education and training, and considering ways to implement MD to protect wing operations. Commanders are also responsible for developing MD policies, objectives, instructions, and training programs. The key to successfully accomplishing these actions lies in the appointment of a hardworking and dedicated MDO who, as the commander's representative, implements and manages the program. MDOs are required to fill the position for a minimum of one year. HQ AMC will provide funding for all MD-specific training and equipment required for the successful accomplishment of MD operations.

3.5. Military Deception Officer Responsibilities. Wing MDOs are the focal point for all deception activities associated with their base/wing and are responsible for all actions concerning their respective MD program. More information on MDO responsibilities is included in [Attachment 2](#) of this pamphlet and AFI 10-704/AMC1, *Military Deception Program*. MDOs must be intimately familiar with base/wing day-to-day operations. They are responsible for looking at operations from the larger perspective. They should know the behind-the-scenes activities that impact operations, the coordination required to accomplish MD at the various staff levels, and the normal operational signatures at their base.

3.6. Coordination. For successful MD, thorough coordination is critical to ensure all aspects of the operation are considered. To plan an MD activity and have it compromised by unforeseen events results in wasted effort, potential embarrassment, and possible exposure of our methods and means. The likelihood of unseen events is greatly reduced by identifying experts in the appropriate functional areas and bringing them together to assure all required coordination is accomplished. It is not possible for one person to cover all aspects of an operation, which is why a solid MD working group is essential.

3.7. Military Deception Working Group (MDWG).

- 3.7.1. With the support of the wing and operations group commanders, MDOs will establish a MDWG. The charter of the MDWG is to explore ways to plan and implement MD initiatives.
- 3.7.2. The MDWG must understand the concept of MD, know the base Operations Security (OPSEC) indicators, and have the expertise to accomplish MD taskings.
- 3.7.3. Working group representatives will vary from base to base. Group composition is dependent on wing mission and local expertise. As a rule of thumb, the core working group should include person-

nel from: intelligence, mission development, wing plans, and maintenance as well as the wing OPSEC program manager. Additional vital members may be drawn from communications, accounting and finance, medical, logistics, public affairs, Office of Special Investigations, security forces, disaster preparedness, administration, and any others deemed necessary to conduct an MD operation.

3.7.4. The MDWG can provide an excellent forum for conducting awareness training and thus ensure a broad functional understanding of MD. Additionally, it can be an effective means of pooling and crossfeeding MD conceptual ideas and efforts.

3.8. Military Deception Officer Training.

3.8.1. New MDOs should receive a combination of on-the-job training conducted by the outgoing MDO or one of the alternates and formal training by attending at the Air Force Introduction to Military Deception (IMD) course. It is mandatory that a current, organized, and detailed continuity file is kept. Recommended contents for a continuity file are at [Attachment 3](#) of this pamphlet. HQ AMC/DOKI funds formal training for one primary MDO and up to two alternate MDOs. Requests for formal training should be forwarded to HQ AMC/DOKI.

3.8.2. Immediately upon appointment, MDOs should:

- 3.8.2.1. Contact HQ AMC/DOKI and secure a date for formal training.
- 3.8.2.2. Perform an in-depth review the MD continuity file.
- 3.8.2.3. Contact his/her alternates and attempt to arrange in-house training in the interim.
- 3.8.2.4. Solicit assistance for specific questions from HQ AMC/DOKI.

3.9. AMC Military Deception Initiatives. Since AMC is normally a supporting command, MD should not be developed unilaterally. This is not to say that AMC MDOs should not examine ways to apply MD to daily operations, local exercises and contingency operations; however, when developing deception execution checklists, AMC MDOs must consider the relationship with other commands and services and the interface required to preclude possible conflicts. Do not plan deception activities with other MAJCOMs/Wings unless specifically given direct liaison authority from HQ AMC/DOKI. Regardless of the scope and extent of a proposed exercise, always forward your ideas to AMC/DOKI for deconfliction, review, and approval.

Chapter 4

MILITARY DECEPTION IN OPERATIONS AND PLANS

4.1. General. The most effective operations have integrated deception planning with operational planning at the outset. AFI 10-704 and AMC Supplement 1 require that MD actions and activities be considered in exercise and operations planning. MD should be employed in exercises to practice concepts and techniques. MDOs must bring together their working groups to formulate and discuss MD plans. During exercises, planners find out how a planned activity worked, if enough coordination was accomplished, what pitfalls cost success, and what will make it work better next time. This information is then recorded via lessons-learned.

4.2. MD Planning Considerations.

4.2.1. MDOs must work with operations and exercise planners to consider the overall mission objectives and the specific deception objective when developing deception execution checklists.

4.2.2. As the mission unfolds, opportunities for MD must be examined. As mission objectives change, MD efforts must change. By applying MD during the initial stages of mission planning, a supporting MD activity can be a key ingredient to mission success.

4.3. Contingency Planning. What about the short-notice, quick reaction events that routinely occur? It is necessary to have some capabilities already developed. AMC has tasked MDOs at all levels to develop generic execution checklists. The prior planning and coordination necessary to prepare for these tasks affords MDOs necessary on-the-shelf information to support quick reaction requirements. These checklists should provide the eighty percent solution for most tasks and allow for rapid fleshing out into successful plans.

4.4. MD Versus OPSEC. MD differs from traditional security measures in that MD feeds information, while traditional security measures attempt to deny information. OPSEC seeks to protect or eliminate operational indicators of sensitive and classified information. The relationship between OPSEC and MD is dynamic. OPSEC determines the security baseline for, and the hostile intelligence collection threat to, a particular base or activity. MD uses that security baseline to manipulate or provide false information to cover and protect sensitive operations, which in turn maintains essential secrecy.

Chapter 5

ESTABLISHING A WING MILITARY DECEPTION PROGRAM

5.1. General. A successful MD program is dependent upon the commander's support. As in any other program, the personnel involved directly impacts the success of the program. MD is an art that requires creativity, tenacity, and commitment, not only from those in day-to-day program operations and management, but from all levels of leadership as well. The right people, with solid support, will form the cornerstone of a sound MD program.

5.1.1. A primary and at least one alternate MDO must be appointed within wings with an aircraft operational responsibility (ownership). MDOs require the full support of the wing and operations group commanders and their staffs.

5.1.2. The optimum place for an MDO is in the tactics or operations plans office. MDOs should be thoroughly familiar with the operational mission, plans, staff interface, and capabilities of their wing.

5.1.3. MDOs require a security clearance equal to the highest level of information handled within the wing, but in no case less than Secret. A Top Secret clearance is highly desirable

5.1.4. MDOs must be designated in a letter signed by the wing commander (the vice-commander or Operations Group commander are acceptable alternatives). MDOs should be retained in their duties for a minimum of one year.

5.2. Education and Training. MDOs and appropriate support personnel should receive sufficient training to understand what MD is, how to accomplish MD, what AMC's MD goals and objectives are, and how their operation fits into the overall big picture.

5.2.1. Primary MDOs will receive formal training by attending the IMD course as soon as possible after appointment, but no more than three months after appointment, unless waived by HQ AMC/DOKI. The AMC MD program manager manages course slots and funding. This course is offered several times a year.

5.2.2. MD training and education awareness for all unit commanders, key personnel, aircrews, and support functions are critical to the success of a wing MD program. Orientation should be one of the early efforts in developing a sound MD program. The principles and techniques of MD, as well as its benefits, must be known and understood throughout the wing. MD education should be a continuous process within each wing. A thorough understanding of MD increases the number of viable ideas for possible implementation.

5.2.3. Support personnel, especially members of MDWGs, should be educated by the wing primary MDO upon appointment.

5.3. Military Deception Operations. As discussed earlier, the more complex an MD initiative, the more coordination required. MDOs are not expected to be experts in every aspect of the wing mission, but they need to know whom the experts are and where to go to get the necessary help. It is absolutely essential for the MDO to establish a comprehensive MD network with appropriately trained personnel.

5.3.1. MDOs must establish a good rapport with their wing commander. They need to be able to proceed directly to the commander when coordinating, implementing, and reporting on MD events. An open door to key decision-makers will allow MDOs to expedite solutions to problems, keep the com-

mand informed, allow for quicker decisions, and speed up coordination. It will also indicate commander support and involvement in the wing MD program.

5.3.2. MDOs should attempt to gain as much experience and hands-on training as possible by planning and implementing more MD initiatives in local exercises and daily operations. Select opportunities that allow for simple MD efforts at first. As more and more activities occur, MDO confidence will build, lessons will be learned, and the MDWG will gain experience, thus resulting in streamlined coordination.

5.3.3. After MD execution, analyze the good and bad aspects of the operation and prepare an after action report detailing lessons learned. Forward the reports to HQ AMC/DOKI. The lessons learned should also be briefed to the members of the MDWG who participated in a particular event, and to appropriate commanders. Lessons learned are used in command cross-tells. This important exchange of information provides valuable experience to other MDOs, aids in planning ideas for MD, and strengthens the entire command program.

5.4. Program Security. MD is extremely sensitive and requires strict security. Depending on the scope of MD effort, the consequences can be far reaching. Detailed security requirements are listed in the *USAF Military Deception Security Classification Guide*, AFI 10-704, and AFI 10-704 AMC Sup 1. The guide covers general instructions, physical security, communications, operations, and exercises, as well as support matters. Copies of this document may be obtained from the AMC MD program manager.

5.4.1. Secrecy is critical in planning MD efforts. Coordination requirements can be a potential obstacle to secrecy. MDOs must continually analyze who has a true need-to-know. In MD operations, it is normal to have some unwitting participants. The MDO controls access to and dissemination of MD information.

5.4.2. Although Defense Messaging System (DMS) is now the standard for message traffic, it does not afford the security required by the MD program. To assure essential security, all major commands are part of the Air Staff MD Special Category (SPECAT) AUTODIN communications system. The SPECAT communications system is a system that ensures limited distribution of information. Awareness of the MD SPECAT system is taught at the Air Staff IMD training course and outlined in the course study guide.

5.4.3. MDOs will provide servicing communications centers with a letter of instruction for managing message traffic. (An example letter of instruction is at [Attachment 4](#). The letter should identify those persons authorized to receipt for MD messages. Generally, the primary and alternate MDOs, as well as the commander, should be on the letter to receive SPECAT messages. Be sure to immediately update letters of instruction whenever personnel change. A sample SPECAT message is found at [Attachment 5](#).

5.4.4. SPECAT is the preferred method for dissemination of classified MD information. Other methods of communication are secure facsimile transmission and PROCOMM. PROCOMM is a software

program that enables secure, point-to-point data file transmission through the use of a STU/STE and a computer.

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Assistant Director for Operations

Attachment 1**GLOSSARY OF REFERENCES AND SUPPORTING INFORMATION*****References***

USAF Military Deception Security Classification Guide

AFI 10-704, Military Deception Program

AFI 10-704, AMCS1, Military Deception Program

Abbreviations and Acronyms

AMC—Air Mobility Command

CONPLAN—Concept Plan

MD—Military Deception

MDNCO —Military Deception Non-Commissioned Officer

MDO—Military Deception Officer

MDWG—Military Deception Working Group

OPCON—Operational Control

OPLAN—Operations Plan

OPSEC—Operations Security

SPECAT—Special Category

Attachment 2**MILITARY DECEPTION OFFICER DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES**

A2.1. General. MDOs at wing level must have a solid understanding of the wing mission, staff relationships, and operational procedures. They should also have a working knowledge of Air Force and AMC planning processes and directives, as well as appropriate wing OPLANs, CONPLANs, exercise plans, and mobility plans.

A2.2. Wing Military Deception Officer. As wing programs evolve, duties and responsibilities of MDOs may change. The following provides a good starting point for wing programs. MDOs will:

- A2.2.1. Act as the focal point for all MD issues.
- A2.2.2. Direct, coordinate, and execute MD planning activities for the base.
- A2.2.3. Develop an Execution Checklist for each of the five skills of MD.
- A2.2.4. Identify the local base signatures associated with operations and develop counter measures.
- A2.2.5. Develop, implement, monitor, and evaluate MD awareness education and training activities for key staff agencies and subordinate or tenant units as required.
- A2.2.6. Attend conferences and training sessions, prepare reports, and provide information to subordinate and tenant units.
- A2.2.7. Conduct periodic MD working group meeting (at least quarterly).
- A2.2.8. Interface and work closely with wing operations planners to review and analyze plans for MD requirements.
- A2.2.9. Establish MD points of contact within major staff functions.
- A2.2.10. Serve as organizer, recorder, advisor, and MDWG chairperson and ensure dissemination of meeting minutes to all participants.
- A2.2.11. Respond to higher headquarters MD taskings and ensure appropriate wing coordination.
- A2.2.12. Coordinate with higher headquarters on proposed MD efforts to resolve any potential conflicts.
- A2.2.13. Control, maintain, and manage the MD SPECAT communications system. Control MD information and determine dissemination.
- A2.2.14. Provide resource requirements to higher headquarters for MD program development and maintenance.
- A2.2.15. Look for opportunities to implement MD into the wing mission.
- A2.2.16. Develop and maintain a continuity file according to guidance in AFI 10-704/AMC1.

Attachment 3**RECOMMENDED CONTINUITY FILE CONTENTS**

A3.1. It is recommended that the following items be kept on file for continuity purposes. This list is by no means all-inclusive and should be tailored to the wing mission and local conditions.

A3.1.1. Instructions and Directives

A3.1.1.1. Joint Pub 3-58 *Joint Doctrine for Military Deception*

A3.1.1.2. AFPD 10-7 *Command and Control Warfare*

A3.1.1.3. AFI 10-704 *Military Deception Program*

A3.1.1.4. AFI 10-704/AMC1 *Military Deception Program*

A3.1.1.5. AMCP 10-703 *AMC Military Deception Awareness*

A3.1.1.6. AMCI 10-704 *Information Operations*

A3.1.1.7. AFI 10-1101 *Operations Security*

A3.1.1.8. AFI 10-1101/AMC1 *Operations Security*

A3.1.1.9. *USAF MD Security Classification Guide*

A3.1.2. Letters of Instruction and Appointment

A3.1.2.1. MDO Appointment Letter

A3.1.2.2. Letter of Authority/Letter of Introduction

A3.1.2.3. SPECAT Message Handling Instructions

A3.1.3. Sample Courier Letter

A3.1.4. MDWG Information

A3.1.4.1. MDWG Membership Roster

A3.1.4.2. MDWG Minutes (by Fiscal Year (FY))

A3.1.5. Exercise Information

A3.1.5.1. Exercises Planned (by FY)

A3.1.5.2. Exercises Executed (by FY)

A3.1.5.3. Exercise After Action Reports

A3.1.6. Operational Activity

A3.1.6.1. HHQ Taskings Planned

A3.1.6.2. HHQ Taskings Executed

A3.1.6.3. HHQ After Action Reports

A3.1.7. Annual Report

A3.1.8. Cross-Talk Information

A3.1.9. Other Information of Interest

Attachment 4**SAMPLE LETTER OF INSTRUCTION**MEMORANDUM FOR *(Servicing Communications Center)**(Date)*FROM: *(Unit)*

SUBJECT: (U) Special Category (SPECAT) Message Handling Procedures

1. (U) Instructions in this letter pertain to SPECAT messages addressed to or generated by *(your unit and office symbol)*.

2. (U) Handling Procedures:

a. (U) Outgoing Sarahlite message disks will be delivered to the Communications Center in a sealed envelope by an individual listed in paragraph 4a of this letter. One of the operators or supervisors authorized to handle SPECAT communications will be required to sign a message log verifying receipt. The returned message disks will be enclosed in a sealed envelope and returned to this office.

b. (U) Incoming messages must be hand delivered only to designated personnel listed in Para 4a of this letter. Under no circumstances will these messages be placed in routine administrative channels or be provided to other offices or personnel.

3. (U) Filing. File copies of messages must not be maintained in the comm center. If required, dummy copies containing only administrative data may be substituted. Waste material must be returned to this office for destruction. A safe must be used for temporary storage of other than immediate precedence messages received during non-duty hours. All copies of incoming and outgoing message forms will be relinquished for permanent disposition.

4. Message Delivery and Receipt:

a. The following personnel are authorized to deliver and receive SPECAT messages:

Maj Give M. Secrets	111-22-3333	Duty: 555-1111	Home: 555-2222	Cell: 555-3333
SMSgt John Public	222-33-4444	Duty: 555-4444	Home: 555-5555	Cell: 555-6666
Capt Jane Doe	555-66-7777	Duty: 555-7777	Home: 555-8888	Cell: 555-9999

b. For immediate precedence messages after normal duty hours, contact the personnel above in the order listed.

(MDO SIGNATURE BLOCK)

NOTE: All information in this sample letter of instruction is provided for example only. Provide this letter to the communications center to see if it meets their needs.

Attachment 5**SAMPLE SPECAT MESSAGE**

01 01 000000Z MAY 02 RR CCCC BBBB

FROM: HQ AMC SCOTT AFB IL//DOKI//

TO: 319OG GRAND FORKS AFB ND//(*no functional address symbol*)

CLASSIFICATION SPECAT (X) *Where X is appropriate classification symbol*

THIS IS A CREDIBLE WOLF MESSAGE (U)
DELIVER DURING NORMAL DUTY HOURS TO THE CREDIBLE WOLF FOCAL POINT
OFFICER (FPO). FURTHER DISSEMINATION ONLY AS DIRECTED BY THE FPO

SUBJECT: **(U)** APPROPRIATE CLASSIFICATION OF THE SUBJECT AND SHORT DESCRIPTION
ON THE MESSAGE CONTENTS

REFERENCES: A LIST OF PREVIOUS MESSAGES WITH DATE TIME GROUPS THAT HAVE A
BEARING ON THE SUBJECT MESSAGE ARE GENERALLY LISTED HERE WITH THEIR
APPROPRIATE CLASSIFICATIONS

1. **(U)** EVERY PARAGRAPH SHOULD BEGIN WITH THE APPROPRIATE CLASSIFICATION
LEVEL IN PARENTHESIS. THE FIRST PARAGRAPH WILL OUTLINE THE PURPOSE OF THE
MESSAGE.
2. **(U)** EACH SUBSEQUENT PARAGRAPH WILL BEGIN WITH THE APPROPRIATE CLASSIFI-
CATION LEVEL IN PARENTHESIS AND THEN CONTINUE TO EXPAND ON THE SUBJECT
3. **(U)** THE FINAL PARAGRAPH WILL NORMALLY REQUEST THAT THE RECIPIENT
ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT AND UNDERSTANDING OF THE MESSAGE BY CONTACTING THE
POC (ALSO LISTED IN THE FINAL PARAGRAPH) VIA TELEPHONE.

THIS IS A CREDIBLE WOLF MESSAGE (U).
DECLASSIFY ON: EXEMPT (E.O. 12958 1.6 (X4)) *or appropriate date or circumstance*